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positive samples have been identiﬁ  ed 
during outbreaks. Molecular methods 
may serve as an adjunct to traditional 
laboratory methods by improving sen-
sitivity and also enabling diagnosis of 
Shigella spp. outbreaks among remote 
populations where specimen storage 
and transport requirements may be 
challenging (10).
We describe extremely high rates 
of resistance of Shigella spp. to co-
trimoxazole, the recommended treat-
ment for bloody diarrhea in Papua 
New Guinea. Strengthening national 
surveillance for antimicrobial drug re-
sistance would provide the evidence to 
better inform policy decision makers. 
A review of the national antimicrobial 
drug policy for management of bloody 
diarrhea is urgently needed.
Acknowledgments
We thank Darrel Cecil, Temas Ikanoﬁ  , 
Leomeldo Latorre, and Luisa Wanma 
for their diagnostic support and Anthony 
Gomes and Eigil Sorensen for their techni-
cal support.
Alexander Rosewell, 
Berry Ropa, Enoch Posanai, 
Samir R. Dutta, Glen Mola, 
Anthony Zwi, 
and C. Raina MacIntyre
Author afﬁ  liations:  World Health Organiza-
tion, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (A. 
Rosewell); National Department of Health, 
Port Moresby (B. Ropa, E. Posanai); Port 
Moresby General Hospital, Port Moresby 
(S.R. Dutta); University of Papua New 
Guinea, Port Moresby (G. Mola); and Uni-
versity of New South Wales, Sydney, New 
South Wales, Australia (A. Rosewell, A. 
Zwi, C.R. MacIntyre)
DOI: 10.3201/eid1611.101025
References
    1.   Niyogi SK. Shigellosis. J Microbiol. 
2005;43:133–43. 
  2.   World Health Organization. Generic pro-
tocol to estimate the burden of Shigella 
diarrhoea and dysenteric mortality. 1999 
May [cited 2010 Mar 10]. http://www.
who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsP-
DF99/www9947.pdf
  3.   Vince JD. Diarrhoea in children in Papua 
New Guinea. P N G Med J. 1995;38:262–
71. 
  4.   Miwatani T, Honda T, Higashitsutsumi M, 
Tanaka R, Sakaue Y, et al. Bacterial aetiol-
ogy of infantile diarrhoea in Papua New 
Guinea. J Trop Pediatr. 1990;36:101–3. 
  5.   Bukenya GB, Kaiser R, Nneka N. Rotavi-
rus from children of an urban settlement 
of Papua New Guinea. J Trop Pediatr. 
1990;36:66–8. 
    6.    Curtis PG. The isolation, incidence and 
sensitivity of Shigella organisms. P N G 
Med J. 1964;7:23–6.
  7.   World  Health  Organization.  Guidelines 
for the control of shigellosis, including ep-
idemics due to Shigella dysenteriae type 1 
[cited 2010 Mar 10]. http://www.who.int/
topics/cholera/publications/shigellosis/en/
index.html
  8.   Standard treatment for common illnesses 
of children in Papua New Guinea—a man-
ual for nurses, community health workers, 
health extension ofﬁ  cers and doctors. 8th 
ed. Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea): 
National Department of Health; 2005.
  9.   Christopher PR, David KV, John SM, San-
karapandian V. Antibiotic therapy for Shi-
gella dysentery. Cochrane Database Syst 
Rev. 2010;1:CD006784.
10.   Farfán MJ, Garay TA, Prado CA, Filliol I, 
Ulloa MT, Toro CS. A new multiplex PCR 
for differential identiﬁ  cation of Shigella 
ﬂ  exneri and Shigella sonnei and detection 
of Shigella virulence determinants. Epide-
miol Infect. 2010 Apr;138:525–33. Epub 
2009 Sep 18.
Address for correspondence: Alexander 
Rosewell, World Health Organization, 4th Floor 
AOPI Centre, PO Box 5896, Port Moresby, 
Papua New Guinea; email: rosewella@wpro.
who.int
Fatal Avian 
Inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
Infection in Human, 
China
To the Editor: Since the ﬁ  rst 
avian inﬂ   uenza virus (H5N1) was 
isolated from a goose in the southern 
region of the People’s Republic of 
China a decade ago (1), no poultry 
outbreak has been reported in Shan-
dong Province in eastern China, al-
though adjacent provinces have expe-
rienced an avian inﬂ  uenza epidemic 
(2). In fall 2008, several rounds of 
investigation of poultry farms and 
markets were conducted in Jinan, 
Shandong Province, and no inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1) was isolated by reverse 
transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) from 
19,340 poultry oropharyngeal, cloa-
cal, and cage specimens.
However, a fatal inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
infection in a human was identiﬁ  ed on 
January 17, 2009 (3). The patient was 
a 27-year-old woman from Jinan. In-
ﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) developed on 
January 5, and the patient received in-
travenous ribavirin and cephalosporins 
on January 9. On January 11, she was 
hospitalized for fever (41°C) and re-
spiratory symptoms. On January 15, 
extensive inﬁ  ltration in both lungs de-
veloped; the diagnosis was pneumonia 
of unknown etiology. Early on January 
17, she underwent endotracheal intu-
bation. She died of acute respiratory 
distress syndrome and multiple organ 
failure later that day.
Two endotracheal aspirates col-
lected on January 17 were positive for 
inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) and for genes 
encoding matrix protein by real-time 
PCR and RT-PCR. However, throat 
swabs collected on January 15 and 
16 had been negative even after re-
peated testing (Table). The inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1) was isolated on January 
22 after 48-hour culture and named 
A/Shandong/1/2009(H5N1). Whole-
genome sequencing showed that all 
segments were of avian origin. The 
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hemagglutinin gene and amino acid 
sequences of this virus were highly 
homologous with 24 strains of inﬂ  u-
enza virus (H5N1) isolated during 
2005–2008 in China. There was no 
change in the hemagglutinin cleavage 
or the receptor binding sites or in the 
neuraminidase gene conferring osel-
tamivir resistance (4). Nevertheless, 
mutations in the matrix 2 gene indi-
cated amantadine resistance (5).
The patient was a stay-at-home 
mother with a daughter 20 months 
of age. Her husband operated a bar-
becue food stand. The raw poultry 
ingredients (duck blood and chicken 
hearts) for the barbecue were washed 
and processed at home, and the pa-
tient may have had unprotected con-
tact with raw poultry products. How-
ever, the patient did not raise poultry, 
did not have contact with sick or dead 
poultry, had not visited a poultry mar-
ket recently, and had not consumed 
sick or dead poultry or raw poultry 
food. No inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) was 
detected by RT-PCR from the raw 
duck blood and chicken hearts saved 
in the patient’s home refrigerator or 
at the poultry seller where the duck 
blood and chicken hearts originated. 
No inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) was de-
tected by RT-PCR from 448 poultry 
oropharayngeal and cloacal speci-
mens collected from the live poultry 
markets immediately after the virus 
was identiﬁ  ed in the patient.
The patient’s close contacts  (157 
persons), including family members 
and healthcare professionals, were 
isolated and monitored medically for 
7 days according to the Chinese Cen-
ter for Disease Control and Preven-
tion guidelines, but without chemo-
prophylaxis because oseltamivir was 
unavailable. ILI did not develop in 
any of these persons, and all had neg-
ative results for immunoglobulin M 
against inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus. Dur-
ing January 17–23, all 9,865 clinic 
or hospital visitors with respiratory 
symptoms in the patient’s residential 
region were interviewed; 829 had fe-
ver and 586 had ILI. All recovered 
quickly without treatment. Persons 
(537) with frequent exposure to poul-
try were monitored; ILI did not de-
velop in any person. 
This case was comparable to 
some other inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infec-
tions in humans without identiﬁ  ed 
sources of exposure (6,7). The virus 
for this case might have come from 
infected poultry products in the bar-
becue raw ingredients. Viremic blood 
from infected poultry can contami-
nate raw poultry products. It is also 
possible that blood was contaminated 
from poultry struggling during blood 
collection. The shared kitchen for 
cooking and raw poultry product pro-
cessing might be the place where vi-
ral transmission occurred. Although 
the patient had no direct contact with 
raw poultry products, the shared 
utensils might have acted as vectors 
for transmission. Consequently, Jinan 
enhanced public education to increase 
awareness of personal protection for 
persons with direct contact with poul-
try or poultry raw products and their 
family members.
The failure to use oseltamivir re-
sulted from lack of alertness and pre-
paredness by healthcare profession-
als for inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) infection 
because no human inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
infection had been reported in Shan-
dong Province. The lack of a local 
oseltamivir reserve also precluded 
timely oseltamivir use. In response to 
this public health incident,  Jinan en-
hanced education on self-protection, 
case management, empirical oselta-
mivir use, and emergency response 
to inﬂ  uenza by healthcare and public 
health professionals, in addition to 
building a local oseltamivir reserve. 
These efforts led to preparedness and 
timely treatment with oseltamivir 
during the second case of inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection in 
China on May 11, 2009 (8).
Because inﬂ  uenza viruses (H5N1) 
can replicate efﬁ  ciently only in cells 
of the lower respiratory tract where 
the avian virus receptor is prevalent 
(9), it is better to collect lower respira-
tory tract specimens early for labora-
tory testing. Given that early oseltami-
vir administration is critical and most 
effective (10), oseltamivir should be 
administered quickly to patients with 
pneumonia of unknown etiology with-
out waiting for laboratory conﬁ  rma-
tion of inﬂ  uenza infection. 
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Table.  Clinical specimens collected from patient with fatal avian influenza virus (H5N1) infection and test results, Shandong Province,
China*
Specimen type 
Collection date, 
Jan 2009  Place tested  Test method  Result
Nasopharyngeal swab   15  Shandong CDC  RT-PCR  A/H5HA/AN1 negative 
Nasopharyngeal swab   15  Shandong CDC  Real-time PCR  A/H5HA/H5NA negative 
Nasopharyngeal swab   16  Shandong CDC  RT-PCR  A/H5HA/AN1 negative 
Nasopharyngeal swab   16  Shandong CDC  Real-time PCR  A/H5HA/H5NA negative 
Endotracheal aspirate   17  Shandong CDC  RT-PCR  A/H5HA/AN1 positive 
Endotracheal aspirate   17  Shandong CDC  Real-time PCR  A/H5HA/H5NA positive 
Endotracheal aspirate   17  China CDC  RT-PCR  A/H5HA/AN1 positive 
Endotracheal aspirate   17  China CDC  Real-time PCR  A/H5HA/H5NA positive 
*CDC, Center for Disease Control and Prevention; RT-PCR, reverse transcription–PCR.  LETTERS
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Mycobacterium 
heckeshornense 
Infection in 
HIV-infected 
Patient
To the Editor:  Mycobacterium 
heckeshornense is a slow-growing 
scotochromogen phenotypically and 
phylogenetically related to M. xenopi. 
It was ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed as a cause of lung 
infection on the basis of unique 16s 
rRNA and 16S–23S spacer sequenc-
ing (1). Published data are limited to 
the original description and 5 case 
reports in English-language literature 
(2–5). We report disseminated M. 
heckeshornense infection in an HIV-
infected patient and document its role 
as an emerging pathogen.
A man 40 years of age with dif-
fuse large B-cell lymphoma had ad-
vanced HIV infection and a CD4 count 
<10 cells/mm3. Antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) comprising abacavir/lamivu-
dine and lopinavir/ritonavir was initi-
ated. Ongoing night sweats and weight 
loss after chemotherapy prompted 
submission of blood cultures, which 
were positive for M. heckeshornense 
after 41 days’ incubation.
Progressive wasting after 2 
months’ ART prompted treatment for 
M. heckeshornense with isoniazid 
300 mg 1x/d, clarithromycin 500 mg 
2×/d, moxiﬂ  oxacin 400 mg 1×/d, vi-
tamin B6 25 mg 1×/d, and rifabutin 
150 mg 3×/wk. Pretreatment blood 
and urine cultures grew M. hecke-
shornense after 41 and 30 days’ incu-
bation, respectively. After 18 months 
of ART and antimycobacterial thera-
py, the patient’s condition improved, 
and his mycobacterial blood culture 
remained negative.
Blood for cultures was collected 
in Vacutainers (Becton Dickinson, 
Sparks, MD, USA), injected into 
Myco-F lytic media (Becton Dickin-
son), and incubated at 35–37°C in a 
fully automated BACTEC 9000 MB 
(Becton Dickinson) blood culture 
instrument for 42 days. Ziehl-Neels-
en stain conﬁ  rmed  acid-fast  bacilli 
(AFB) after 41 days. Gen-Probe Ac-
cuProbe DNA probes (Gen-Probe 
Incorporated, San Diego, CA, USA) 
for  M. avium and M. tuberculosis 
complexes were negative. The ini-
tial blood culture was subcultured to 
Middlebrook 7H11 media and incu-
bated at 35°–37°C, demonstrating a 
growth range of 37°–45°C (optimal 
growth at 42°–45°C). The isolate was 
forwarded to the National Reference 
Centre for Mycobacteriology (Win-
nipeg, Manitoba, Canada) for partial 
16S ribosomal RNA gene sequence 
identiﬁ   cation. It corresponded with 
100% sequence identity to the type 
strain of M. heckeshornense. The 
16S rRNA gene sequence analyzed 
for this isolate was 1,314 bp long and 
presented a divergence of 2.6% from 
its closest species, M. xenopi.
Optimal growth temperature and 
extended time to isolation of the initial 
isolate prompted a second incubation 
period of 42 days (total of 84 days) for 
all subsequent cultures. A subsequent 
blood culture was positive at 53 days 
of incubation. If negative after this 
reincubation period, a terminal Ziehl-
Neelsen smear was performed to con-
ﬁ  rm absence of AFB.
Susceptibility testing of the ini-
tial blood and urine isolates was 
performed by using the radiometric 
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